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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the circumstances and estate plans of two decedents, 
Testator and Settlor. Testator executes a will that devises her entire 
estate. The will does not provide for, or state an intention to disinherit, a 
child born after the execution of the will. Testator then has a child, A. 
Similarly, Settlor establishes and funds an inter-vivos revocable trust to 
dispose of her assets at her death. The trust instrument does not provide 
for, or express an intention to disinherit, an afterborn child. Settlor 
subsequently has a child, B. Suppose Testator and Settlor both die 
shortly thereafter as single Ohio domiciliaries. Testator dies without 
revoking her will or executing a new will, and Settlor dies without 
having revoked or revised the trust instrument. Will the afterborn 
children receive a share of the estate or the trust? 
To answer this question, it is necessary to look to what are 
commonly referred to as omitted child or pretermitted heir statutes.1 
Such statutes, however, have traditionally applied only to wills,2 and 
neither the General Assembly nor the courts in Ohio have made its 
pretermitted heir statute applicable to revocable trusts.3 Thus, under 
Ohio’s pretermitted heir statute, because A was omitted from Testator’s 
will, A is entitled to an intestate share of the estate.4 Conversely, because 
*J.D. Candidate, The University of Akron School of Law, May 2017. Production Editor, Akron Law 
Review, 2016-2017. B.A. in Psychology and Justice Studies, magna cum laude, Kent State
University, 2013. The author would like to thank Professor Alan Newman for his assistance with
this article.
1. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 9.6 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
2. See Alan Newman, Revocable Trusts and the Law of Wills: An Imperfect Fit, 43 REAL 
PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 523, 550 (2008). 
3. See infra Part II.
4. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.34 (West, Westlaw through File 2 of the 132nd GA (2017-
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B was unintentionally disinherited from a revocable trust instrument, and 
although the situations of A and B are very much alike, it is unlikely B 
will receive a share of Settlor’s trust assets. That outcome, however, is 
not entirely clear, as there is some authority for applying rules under the 
law of wills to will substitutes such as revocable trusts even in the 
absence of explicit statutory authority for doing so.5 
Generally, pretermitted heir statutes protect a child, and under some 
statutes a more remote descendant of the testator from unintentional 
disinheritance.6 Their purpose is to carry out the presumed intent of the 
decedent to provide for a child inadvertently omitted from the will.7 
Because revocable trusts are regularly used as substitutes for wills, 
primarily to avoid probate administration,8 presumptions regarding the 
intent of a decedent that are applicable to wills should also be applicable 
2018)). This is the result because Testator died single. In Ohio, if the testator has a surviving spouse, 
the pretermitted heir receives an intestate share of only that portion of the estate which is not left to 
the surviving spouse. Id.; see also UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-302 (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 194-95 
(2013). 
5. See generally John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law
of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108 (1984); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.2 (AM. LAW INST. 2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 
25(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 34.2(2) 
(AM. LAW INST. 1992). 
6. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.6 cmt.
d. The disinheritance of a child must be unintentional for the statute to apply. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB.
CODE § 2-302. Under the Uniform Probate Code, the statute does not apply if it appears that the
omission was intentional by the language of the will or if the testator provided for the afterborn 
child by nonprobate transfer in lieu of providing for the child in the will. Id. § 2-302(b).
Most omitted child or heir statutes protect only persons born after a testator’s execution of her will,
although some also apply to children or other heirs who were living when the testator executed the
will. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.6(a). 
7. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.6
cmt. i (Because omitted child statutes only protect persons from unintentional disinheritance, they 
yield to a contrary intent.). 
8. Today, the widely accepted public conception of probate administration is that it is
costly, time consuming, too complex, and lacks privacy. David Horton, In Partial Defense of 
Probate: Evidence from Alameda County, California, 103 GEO. L.J. 605, 639-41 (2015); see also 
Karen M. Moore, Current Issues Under the Ohio Trust Code: The Revocable Trust, Chapter 5806, 
25 OHIO PROB. L.J. 8 (2015). By the use of will substitutes, individuals are able to avoid these 
disadvantages of the probate system. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER 
DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 7.1-7.2; see also Langbein, supra note 5, at 1108-09. Other common uses 
of revocable trusts are to prepare for the settlor’s incapacity, see Nathaniel W. Schwickerath, Note, 
Public Policy and the Probate Pariah: Confusion in the Law of Will Substitutes, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 
769, 777 (2000) (citing Louis A. Mezzullo et al., Planning for Incapacity, C712 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 319, 
333-34 (1991)), and to provide privacy with respect to the disposition of the settlor’s assets, Moore,
supra note 8 (discussing the increase in accessibility to individuals’ information with the use of the
Internet). Revocable trusts can also be easily created and amended. Id.; see also Langbein, supra 
note 5, at 1113 (explaining the widely offered “standard-form revocable trusts with fill-in-the blank
beneficiary designations”). 
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to revocable trusts.9 Additionally, many other problems that arise when 
disposing of a testator’s property at death may also arise with a settlor’s 
use of a revocable trust,10 and there is a recent trend toward resolving 
these problems by looking to the law of wills.11 Consequently, in Ohio, 
several statutory rules that apply to wills have been extended to apply to 
revocable trusts.12 
This Comment argues that the Ohio legislature should similarly 
extend the wills pretermitted heir statute to revocable trusts. Part II of 
this Comment provides the statutory background of the Ohio 
pretermitted heir statute and a review of Ohio cases involving the 
application of the law of wills to revocable trusts, as well as the few non-
Ohio cases that have addressed the issue of whether pretermitted heir 
statutes are applicable to revocable trusts. Part III addresses whether 
Ohio’s pretermitted heir statute, although not explicitly applicable to 
revocable trusts, nevertheless could be so applied and concludes that it is 
unlikely that an Ohio court would apply the current pretermitted heir 
statute to a revocable trust. Part IV addresses whether Ohio’s 
pretermitted heir statute should be amended to apply to revocable trusts, 
the most commonly used will-substitute,13 and considers the rationale 
for such an amendment. Part V of this Comment then proposes two 
alternatives for the Ohio legislature to resolve this issue. First, Part V 
recommends that the legislature enact a statute that will provide 
guidance in the application of wills statutes to revocable trusts more 
broadly, as these interpretation and constructional issues will continue to 
arise in many other contexts.14 Second, Part V recommends and 
concludes that the legislature should amend the pretermitted heir statute 
9. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 2, at 550 (explaining that it is difficult to defend the
UPC’s treatment of a decedent’s failure to modify his will after the birth of a child as unintentional, 
but not to similarly treat a decedent’s failure to modify his revocable trust). 
10. Id. at 523-24; see also Langbein, supra note 5, at 1136-37 (emphasizing the necessity of
acknowledging the will-like character of will substitutes in order to achieve uniform resolutions to 
“functionally identical problems”).  
11. Newman, supra note 2, at 524-25; Langbein, supra note 5, at 1141 (“The law of wills has 
reached sound solutions to these interpretive questions, and I have urged that these solutions should 
extend presumptively to the will-like transfers of the nonprobate system.”); William M. McGovern 
Jr., Nonprobate Transfers Under the Revised Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1329, 1352 
(1992) (“The sensible rules developed as guides to the construction of wills ought to be applied to 
will substitutes.”). 
12. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.33(D) (West, Westlaw through File 2 of the
132nd GA (2017-2018)) (Revocation of will by divorce); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5815.31 
(Revocation of trust by divorce). 
13. Moore, supra note 8. 
14. See id.; see also Brian Layman, The Traditional Wills Doctrine of Ademption and Its
Exceptions Should be Extended to Revocable Trusts, 13 OHIO PROB. L.J. 119 (2003). 
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to apply to inter-vivos revocable trusts. 
II. BACKGROUND
In every state except Louisiana, a testator may disinherit a child.15 
Although most states provide some protection against unintentional 
disinheritance of a child or heir, the protection differs by state.16 The 
extent of protection may be dependent upon whether a state has enacted 
an omitted child or pretermitted heir statute. For example, some statutes 
apply only to children born after the execution of the will,17 while others 
also protect more remote descendants.18 Generally, such statutes do not 
offer protection to a child born before the execution of the will;19 
however, a few statutes protect any omitted child or heir, whether alive 
or not when the will was executed, from inadvertent disinheritance.20 
Although these statutes differ, their fundamental purpose of carrying out 
the decedent’s presumed intent remains the same.21 
A. Ohio’s Pretermitted Heir Statute—Section 2107.34 of the Ohio
Revised Code
Ohio enacted a pretermitted heir statute in 1932,22 which was
amended in 1961.23 Prior to the enactment of the statute, the birth of a 
child revoked the testator’s will.24 Under the 1932 statute, if a testator 
15. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.6
note 19 (AM. LAW INST. 2003); see also LA. CONST. ANN. art. 12, § 5 (Westlaw through Jan. 1, 
2017) (Forced heirship and trusts). 
16. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.6
note 18.  
17. See id. § 9.6 cmt. c. Generally, omitted child statutes apply only to afterborn children and
also apply to children adopted after the execution of the will. See id. § 9.6(a). 
18. Id. § 9.6 cmt. a. Some pretermitted heir statutes apply only to children and some apply 
also to more remote descendants. See id. § 9.6 cmt. d; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.34 
(West, Westlaw through File 2 of the 132nd GA (2017-2018)) (If the afterborn child dies before the 
testator, the deceased child’s issue or heir receives the share the parent would have received if 
living.). 
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.6(a). 
20. See id. § 9.6 cmt d. See OKL. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 132 (West, Westlaw through First 
Session of the 56th Legislature (2017)) for an example of a statute that protects children born before 
or after the execution of the will. 
21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.6
cmt. i. 
22. OHIO GEN. CODE. § 10504.49 (1932) (Afterborn or pretermitted heirs; effect on will).
23. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.34 (West, Westlaw through File 2 of the 132nd GA (2017-
2018)). 
24.  The General Code of the State of Ohio Section 10504.49 (1932) (Afterborn or
pretermitted heirs; effect on will) superseded Section 10561 (Birth of a child) (1910) which
5
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had a living child and executed a will, which left nothing to the child nor 
mentioned an afterborn child, and then later had an afterborn child 
without revising or revoking the will, the afterborn child would take an 
intestate share and the living child would be disinherited.25 
Under Ohio’s current pretermitted heir statute, if a testator makes a 
will and, following the execution of the will, has or adopts a child, and 
there is no provision in the will for the pretermitted child or that child’s 
heir or issue, the will is not revoked.26 Instead, the pretermitted heir will 
receive a share equal to what the person would have received out of the 
estate that is not devised to a surviving spouse (had the testator died 
intestate without a surviving spouse)27 unless it appears by the will that 
the testator intended to disinherit the pretermitted heir.28 Similarly, if the 
pretermitted heir dies before the testator, the issue of the deceased 
pretermitted heir will receive the share that the parent would have 
received if still alive.29 
Following the policy of the 1961 amendment, Ohio’s current 
pretermitted heir statute protects children that, at the time of will 
execution, were not born, not considered, or were overlooked.30 Such 
considerations should also apply to children who were not born, not 
considered, or were overlooked at the creation of a trust instrument. 
However, no court in Ohio has yet addressed this issue, and courts from 
other jurisdictions that have done so have been unwilling to apply a wills 
provided:  
If a testator had no children at the time of executing his will, but afterward has a child 
living, or born alive after his death, such will shall be revoked, unless provision has been 
made for such child by some settlement, or he is provided for in the will, or in such a 
way mentioned therein as to show an intention not to make such provision. No other evi-
dence to rebut the presumption of revocation shall be received.  
OHIO GEN. CODE. § 10561 (1910). See also Ash v. Ash, 9 Ohio St. 383, 384 (1959) (holding that 
the will remained revoked following the birth of testatrix’s child even though the testatrix survived 
the child). 
25. OHIO GEN. CODE. § 10504.49 (1932).
26. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.34. Even today in some states, a previous will is revoked
after the birth of a child. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-5-3 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. 
Sess.).  
27. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.3(A) (The heir receives only a share of the property that
was not devised to the surviving spouse.). For the statute to apply, the afterborn child must be born 
within 300 days following the testator’s date of death. See id. § 2107.34(C). However, if the 
testator’s will provides for a posthumously conceived child, the child may take under the statute if 
born within at least one year and 300 days following the testator’s death. See id. 
28. Id. § 2107.3(A). Ohio’s pretermitted heir statute protects not only children born to, or
adopted by, the testator after the execution of the will, but also persons designated by the testator as 
heirs under Section 2105.15 of the Ohio Revised Code. Id.  
29. Id. 
30. See id. 
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pretermitted heir statute to a revocable trust.31 
B. Ohio Supreme Court’s Application of Wills Rules to Revocable
Trusts
Although the issue of whether Ohio’s wills pretermitted heir statute
should be applicable to revocable trusts has never been addressed by an 
Ohio court, Ohio courts have addressed other issues involving the 
application of the law of wills to revocable trusts.32 
For example, in Ohio, a surviving spouse who is not provided for in 
a decedent’s will is given the right to elect against the will and receive a 
share of the decedent’s estate.33 In Dumas v. Estate of Dumas, the Ohio 
Supreme Court considered whether to allow a surviving spouse to elect a 
forced share from a decedent’s revocable trust.34 Reversing the judgment 
of the court of appeals and reaffirming the decision in Smyth,35 the 
Dumas Court held that a revocable trust existing at the time of the 
settlor’s death “bars the settlor’s spouse from claiming a distributive 
share in the trust assets under the statutes of descent and distribution.”36 
In her dissent in Dumas, Justice Resnick noted that by providing for 
a surviving spouse’s right of election against a decedent’s will, the intent 
of the General Assembly to protect the surviving spouse’s interests was 
clear.37 Justice Resnick criticized the majority for ignoring the interests 
of those surviving spouses who are “overlooked” in the provisions of the 
decedent’s trust instrument.38 Justice Resnick placed great emphasis on 
the significance of the surviving spouse’s rights and interests that the 
General Assembly aimed to protect in such cases where a decedent’s 
trust instrument passes all of the decedent’s property to a person other 
than the surviving spouse, because from the surviving spouse’s 
31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.6
note 17 (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“No cases have been found in which the protections by statute or 
case law afforded to a child omitted from a will have been extended to apply to a child omitted from 
a will substitute used as a comprehensive dispositive plan. Courts that have addressed the issue have 
decided against expanding the policy.”). 
32. See Dumas v. Estate of Dumas, 627 N.E.2d 978 (Ohio 1994); see also Dollar Sav. Tr. Co. 
of Youngstown v. Turner, 529 N.E.2d 1261 (Ohio 1988). 
33. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2106.01. 
34. Dumas, 627 N.E.2d at 982-83.
35. Smyth v. Cleveland Tr. Co., 179 N.E.2d 60 (Ohio 1961). 
36. Dumas, 627 N.E.2d at 983. According to the Court, this is the case in the absence of
fraud. Id. However, Ohio is in the minority, because in most states, a surviving spouse can elect a 
forced share of assets in a decedent’s revocable trust. See Moore, supra note 8, at 8. 
37. Dumas, 627 N.E.2d at 983 (Resnick, J., dissenting). 
38. Id. 
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viewpoint, there is no difference between a will and a trust.39 
Justice Resnick then noted that application of the broad rule in 
Smyth could result in “grave injustices” and could ultimately result in 
married persons successfully disinheriting their spouses.40 In Justice 
Resnick’s view, to determine when a surviving spouse can elect against 
a decedent’s inter-vivos trust, the interests of the surviving spouse and 
the right of the decedent to dispose of his or her property must be 
weighed.41 According to Justice Resnick, by drafting a bill that balances 
theses interests, the General Assembly could correct the inequities that 
result from the majority’s broad reading of the Smyth holding that a 
revocable trust “is never reachable by a surviving spouse who exercises 
the right of election.”42 
In Dollar Savings Trust Co. v. Turner, the Supreme Court of Ohio 
addressed the issue of whether Ohio’s anti-lapse statute43 applied to trust 
agreements.44 The court reasoned that although on its face the statute 
was applicable only to wills, its application to trust agreements furthered 
the intent of the legislature.45 Because the inter-vivos trust essentially 
became a testamentary instrument at the settlor’s death, the court 
explained that applying the anti-lapse statute to a revocable trust was 
“wholly consistent” with the legislature’s intent in enacting the statute.46 
Reversing the decision of the court below, the court held that the anti-
lapse statute was applicable to trusts and therefore the death of the settlor 
would prevent the failure of a gift contained within the trust.47 
Following this decision, however, the Ohio General Assembly 
amended Sections 2107.01 and 2107.52 of the Ohio Revised Code in 
response to the court’s decision in Dollar Savings.48 Section 2107.01(A) 
expressly states that a “‘will’ does not include inter-vivos trusts.”49 This 
reversal of the holding in Dollar Savings by the General Assembly 
suggests that in order to make additional wills rules of construction 
39. Id. at 984. 
40. Id. at 985. 
41. Id. at 984. 
42. Id. at 986. 
43. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.52 (West, Westlaw through File 2 of the 132nd GA (2017-
2018)). 
44. Dollar Sav. Tr. Co. of Youngstown v. Turner, 529 N.E.2d 1261, 1263 (Ohio 1988). 
45. Id. at 1264. 
46. Id.
47. Id. 
48. Act of July 8, 1992, § 3, 1992 Ohio Laws File 212. 
49. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.01(A) (West, Westlaw through File 2 of the 132nd GA
(2017-2018)). 
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applicable to trusts, specific statutes must be enacted.50 Recently, in fact, 
the General Assembly did just that by enacting Section 5808.19 of the 
Revised Code, which extended the anti-lapse wills rule of construction 
to trusts.51 
C. Other State Courts Have Declined to Apply the Wills Pretermitted
Heir Statute to Trusts
Although the issue of whether Ohio’s pretermitted heir statute is
applicable to revocable trusts has never been addressed in an Ohio case, 
several other state courts have addressed the issue with respect to their 
states’ pretermitted heir statutes.52 Consistently, these courts have held 
that wills pretermitted heir statutes are not applicable to revocable 
trusts.53 
For example, in the case of In re Estate of Jackson, the Supreme 
Court of Oklahoma addressed whether Oklahoma’s pretermitted heir 
statute applied to a revocable inter-vivos trust.54 The plaintiff 
unsuccessfully argued that children and surviving spouses, as forced 
heirs under pretermitted heir statutes, should be treated the same.55 The 
court considered an earlier Oklahoma case in which the court had 
applied the wills elective share statute that protects surviving spouses to 
a revocable trust.56 Despite having done so, the court in Jackson 
contrasted such forced heir statutes, which limit a married person’s 
power to dispose of his or her property, with Oklahoma’s pretermitted 
heir statute, which was not intended to be a limitation on a testator’s 
power, but rather to assure that a child was not unintentionally omitted 
from a will.57 Consequently, the court found that the pretermitted heir 
statute “unambiguously pertain[ed] to only wills,” and refused to extend 
it to a situation where a child is omitted from a revocable inter-vivos 
trust instrument.58 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas followed similar reasoning in 
50. David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000) and Its Application to Ohio, 30 CAP. 
U. L. REV. 1, 11 (2002). 
51. See infra Part III.C.
52. See In re Estate of Jackson, 2008 OK 83, 194 P.3d 1269; Kidwell v. Rhew, 268 S.W.3d
309 (Ark. 2007); Robbins v. Johnson, 780 A.2d 1282 (N.H. 2001); In re Estate of Cayo, 342 
N.W.2d 785 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983). 
53. See infra Part II.C.
54. Jackson, 2008 OK 83, ¶ 1. 
55. Id. ¶ 18-22. 
56. Thomas v. Bank of Okla., N.A., 1984 OK 41, 684 P.2d 553. 
57. Jackson, 2008 OK 83, ¶ 17-23. 
58. Id. ¶ 17. 
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Kidwell v. Rhew.59 In Kidwell, the court considered the “clear language 
and express terms” of the Arkansas pretermitted heir statute and held 
that it was only applicable to wills.60 The plaintiff argued that had the 
decedent disposed of her estate by a Last Will and Testament with the 
same terms as provided in the decedent’s revocable trust instrument, the 
child would have had rights as a pretermitted heir under the statute.61 
However, the court rejected this argument by reasoning that “will” and 
“trust” are not interchangeable terms, and that the pretermitted heir 
statute does not apply unless there is a will.62 
The plaintiff in Kidwell also unsuccessfully argued that the court 
should follow the Restatement (Second) of Property, which provides that 
in the absence of a controlling statute, when a descendant of a donor is 
omitted as a beneficiary under a will substitute or revocable transfer, the 
policy of the controlling statute applicable to wills should be “applied by 
analogy” to the omitted beneficiary.63 Declining to adopt that approach 
of the Second Restatement, the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that the 
statutory language of the pretermitted heir statute was clear and 
unambiguous and that it was not necessary to look to rules of 
construction.64 
In Robbins v. Johnson, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
addressed whether a pretermitted heir statute was applicable to a trust.65 
The plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that because the trust functioned 
like a will, by providing for the distribution of property after the settlor’s 
death, the pretermitted heir statute should apply.66 The Court examined 
the language of the statute and found that the statute was specifically 
applicable only to wills.67 The court reasoned that it was the role of the 
legislature to decide, as a matter of policy, whether the pretermitted heir 
59. Kidwell v. Rhew, 268 S.W.3d 309 (Ark. 2007). 
60. Id. at 312. 
61. Id. at 311. Arkansas’ pretermitted heir statute applies to living descendants who have
been omitted from the testator’s will, and in this case, the omitted child was living when the 
revocable trust was established. See id. 
62. Id. at 312. 
63. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 34.2 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1992)). 
64. Id. The court pointed to the preface to the Statutory Note and Reporter’s Note of the
Restatement, explaining that no cases have been found that have extended an omitted child statute 
to apply to will substitutes. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 34.2). As such, the plaintiff offered no convincing authority to compel the court to extend the
statute. Id.
65. Robbins v. Johnson, 780 A.2d 1282, 1283 (N.H. 2001). 
66. Id. at 1283-84. 
67. Id. 
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statute should be extended to will substitutes, and “absent clear 
indication from the legislature” of this intention, the court declined to 
extend the statute to trusts.68 
Finally, the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin in In re Estate of Cayo, 
considered whether Wisconsin’s pretermitted heir statute applied to a 
parent’s failure to provide for an afterborn child in a revocable trust 
instrument.69 In Cayo, the decedent executed a will and a trust naming 
her only then-living child as the sole beneficiary.70 The afterborn child’s 
guardian ad litem argued that the afterborn child, under Wisconsin’s 
pretermitted heir statute, was entitled to one-half of the decedent’s assets 
under the will and the trust.71 The Cayo court explained that the 
unambiguous words of the statute “must be given their obvious and 
ordinary meaning.”72 Because the statute applied only to wills and did 
not contemplate a settlor’s failure to provide for an afterborn child in a 
trust, the court held that the afterborn child was a beneficiary under the 
will but not the revocable trust.73 
III. THE APPLICABILITY OF OHIO’S CURRENT PRETERMITTED HEIR
STATUTE TO REVOCABLE TRUSTS 
Although some state courts have held that their pretermitted heir 
statutes do not extend to revocable trusts, public policy suggests that 
Ohio’s pretermitted heir statute should be applied in such a way, because 
the presumed intent of a testator not to disinherit an afterborn (or 
adopted) child is equally applicable to the settlor of a revocable trust.74 
However, under the plain language of the statute, Ohio’s pretermitted 
heir statute is limited to wills. Thus, if an Ohio court were to be 
presented with this issue, it would be necessary for the court to 
determine whether Ohio’s pretermitted heir statute, even in the absence 
of explicit statutory authority, could nevertheless be applied to a 
revocable trust. 
68. Id. at 1284. 
69. In re Estate of Cayo, 342 N.W.2d 785, 786 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 787. 
73. Id. 
74. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 25 cmt. e(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2003); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 34.2(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1992). 
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A. Applying Ohio’s Pretermitted Heir Statute to Trusts is Consistent
with Persuasive Authority
Although the Ohio pretermitted heir statute does not explicitly
apply to trusts, there is some authority that suggests that pretermitted 
heir protection and other wills rules should nevertheless apply to 
revocable trusts and other will substitutes, even when the statutory 
authority for doing so is lacking.75 For example, Section 25 comment 
e(1) of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts provides: 
[A]n array of statutes are found throughout the various American ju-
risdictions that are designed as protections or aids against oversight or
inadequacies in the planning and drafting of wills. These statutes often
fail specifically to address revocable inter vivos trusts . . . . 
Illustrative are pretermitted-heir statutes . . . . 
Sound policy suggests that a property owner’s choice of form in using 
a revocable trust rather than a will as the central instrument of an estate 
plan should not deprive that property owner and the objects of his or 
her bounty of appropriate aids and safeguards intended to achieve like-
ly intentions. Thus, although a particular statute of this general type 
fails to address trusts that are revocable but nontestatmentary, the leg-
islation should ordinarily be applied as if trust dispositive provisions 
that are to be carried out after the settlor’s death had been made by 
will.76 
The Ohio Supreme Court in Dollar Savings adopted an approach similar 
to that of the Third Restatement, explaining that a remedial statute, such 
as the wills anti-lapse statute at issue, “should be extended ‘beyond its 
actual language to cases within its reason and general intent,’”77 
allowing for the statute to be “liberally construed in favor of the persons 
75. See supra note 5. 
76. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 25 cmt. e(1) (discussing statutory protections
against oversight including pretermitted heir and anti-lapse statutes); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.2; Langbein, supra note 5, at 1137 
(explaining that the subsidiary rules for probate and nonprobate transfers should be consistently 
applied as a matter of legislative policy). 
77. Dollar Sav. & Tr. Co. of Youngstown v. Turner, 529 N.E.2d 1261, 1264 (Ohio 1988)
(quoting Rice v. Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Tr. Co., 99 N.E.2d 301, 304 (Ohio 1951)); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.2 reporter’s note 
to cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“The operative canon of statutory construction that allows a court 
to apply a statute to a will substitute although the statute’s terms speak only of a will is that ‘[t]o 
effect its purpose a statute may be implemented beyond its text.’”) (quoting Karl N. Llewellyn, 
Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to 
be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950)). 
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to be benefited.”78 Based on the court’s reasoning in Dollar Savings, 
child B, from the hypothetical presented in the Introduction to this 
Comment, as a person to be benefited from the language of the statute, 
would receive a share of Settlor’s revocable trust. Moreover, because the 
Ohio General Assembly has extended several statutory rules that apply 
to wills to revocable trusts, this may suggest some receptiveness from 
the legislature.79 However, even though there is support for applying the 
wills pretermitted heir statute to revocable trusts, it is unlikely this alone 
would be enough to persuade an Ohio court to do so.80 
B. It is Unlikely an Ohio Court Would Extend the Pretermitted Heir
Statute to Revocable Trusts
First, it is important to consider the clear and unambiguous
language of the Ohio pretermitted heir statute, which reads, in relevant 
part: 
If, after making a will, a testator has a child born alive, [or] adopts a 
child, . . . [u]nless it appears by the will that it was the intention of the 
testator to disinherit the pretermitted child or heir, the devises and leg-
acies granted by the will, except those to a surviving spouse, shall be 
abated proportionately, or in any other manner that is necessary to give 
effect to the intention of the testator as shown by the will . . . .81 
Based on the plain language of the statute and the Ohio General 
Assembly’s response to Dollar Savings, which was the enactment of a 
new Ohio statute defining “will” to expressly exclude inter-vivos 
trusts,82 it is unlikely an Ohio court would extend the statute to a 
revocable trust. This reading of the plain language is consistent with the 
Ohio Supreme Court’s refusal to apply the wills elective share statute to 
revocable trusts in Dumas.83 
Additionally, the Ohio legislature has been selective in its 
enactment of various statutes making wills rules applicable to revocable 
78. Dollar Sav., 529 N.E.2d at 1264 (quoting State ex rel. Maher v. Baker, 102 N.E. 732, 734 
(Ohio 1913)).  
79. Although the General Assembly reversed the holding of Dollar Savings, it has more
recently extended the anti-lapse statute at issue in Dollar Savings, as well as several other statutes, 
to revocable trusts. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5808.19 (West, Westlaw through File 2 of the 
132nd GA (2017-2018)) (Anti-lapse); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5815.31 (Revocation by divorce). 
80. See infra Part III.B.
81. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.34 (emphasis added).
82. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.01(A).
83. Dumas v. Estate of Dumas, 627 N.E.2d 978 (Ohio 1994). 
13
Halachoff: No Child Left Behind
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017
618 AKRON LAW REVIEW [50:605 
trusts in specific contexts.84 Notably, however, the legislature has not 
extended the wills law in the pretermitted heir context.85 Furthermore, 
even the Uniform Probate Code, which in many contexts makes wills 
rules applicable to revocable trusts, does not do so in its pretermitted 
heir statute.86 
C. The Uniform Probate Code
The 1990 revision of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) set out to
unify the law of probate and nonprobate transfers by first recognizing 
that will substitutes and inter-vivos transfers have become a major form 
of wealth transmission today.87 Based in part on the idea that the 
presumptions about a decedent’s intent supplied by wills rules may be 
equally applicable to comparable provisions found in other governing 
instruments, the 1990 revisions reformed wills rules of construction such 
that several rules88 were restructured to apply to wills and all other 
governing instruments.89 However, the 1990 revisions also included a 
section of rules that are applicable only to wills,90 thus extending only 
selected wills construction rules to nonprobate transfers. 
The UPC omitted children statute appears in a section entitled 
“Spouse and Children Unprovided for in Wills” and reads, “[I]f a 
testator fails to provide in his will for any of his [or her] children born or 
adopted after the execution of the will . . . [the] child receives a share in 
the estate.”91 So, unlike other wills construction rules, the UPC’s omitted 
84. See infra Part IV.C. 
85. See Lauren Ashley Gribble, Comment, Justice Before Generosity: Creditors’ Claim to 
Assets of a Revocable Trust After the Death of the Settlor, 48 AKRON L. REV. 383, 413 (2015) 
(“[L]egislative intent may be inferred from what the . . . legislature did not do.”). 
86. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-302 (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 194-95 (2013); Newman, supra 
note 2, at 550. 
87. UNIF. PROB. CODE prefatory note (1990). 
88. See Article II, Part 7 of the Uniform Probate Code for rules of construction, such as the
120-hour survivorship rule, that apply to wills and other governing instruments. Article II, Part 8
also provides general provisions that apply to both probate and nonprobate transfers, including
revocation upon divorce and the elective share statute. Finally, some provisions extend concepts
from the law of wills to apply to certain nonprobate assets. For example, the wills anti-lapse statute,
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-603, is extended by Section 2-207 to future interest in trusts. 
89. UNIF. PROB. CODE prefatory note (1990). 
90. Id. See Article II, Part 6 of the Code for rules of construction that are applicable only to
wills, for example ademption by satisfaction.  
91. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-302 (emphasis added). If, however, the testator has one or more
living children when the will is executed and the will does not make a devise for the then-living 
children, any afterborn or after-adopted children will not receive a share of the estate under the UPC 
omitted child statute. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 9.6 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
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child statute is not extended to revocable trusts, and an omitted child’s 
share is thus limited to probate property.92 In the Prefatory Note, the 
drafters make clear that some of the wills construction rules 
appropriately apply only to wills, such as ademption by satisfaction.93 
However, neither the Prefatory Note, nor the comment to the UPC’s 
omitted child statute, offers an explanation as to why the omitted child 
statute is applicable only to wills.94 
D. The Restatement (Third) of Property
Similar to the UPC, a policy of the Restatement (Third) of Property
is that wills rules of construction and other rules that aid in giving effect 
to a decedent’s presumed intent should be generally applicable to 
donative documents.95 Notably, a comment to Section 7.2 of the Third 
Restatement addresses making wills rules applicable to will substitutes 
on a selective basis in the context of protection against disinheritance.96 
However, Section 9.6, which provides for the protection of a child or 
descendant against unintentional disinheritance, applies only to wills.97 
Because Ohio courts have been largely unwilling to apply wills 
rules to revocable trusts,98 it is unlikely that an Ohio court would choose 
to do so with the clear and unambiguous language of the current Ohio 
pretermitted heir statute and the specific statute enacted after Dollar 
Savings defining a will not to include a trust.99 Similarly, other state 
courts that have addressed the issue have been unwilling to extend wills 
pretermitted heir statutes to revocable trusts.100 Moreover, because state 
supreme courts decided such cases, they may be broadly interpreted by 
92. Melanie B. Leslie & Stewart E. Sterk, Revisiting the Revolution: Reintegrating the
Wealth Transmission System, 56 B.C. L. REV. 61, 69, 114-15 (2015) (explaining that although this 
is the approach taken in most states, by failing to apply the omitted children provision to nonprobate 
assets such as revocable trusts, the UPC does not go far enough in extending the rules of 
construction to nonprobate transfers); see also Newman, supra note 2, at 570 (noting the UPC’s 
failure to extend the pretermitted heir statute to trusts, though contrary to the goal of the UPC to 
unify the laws applicable to probate and nonprobate transfer). 
93. UNIF. PROB. CODE prefatory note (1990). 
94. See id. 
95. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.2 cmt.
a. 
96. Id. cmt. g. 
97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.6. 
98. E.g., Dumas v. Estate of Dumas, 627 N.E.2d 978 (Ohio 1994). 
99. See Schwickerath, supra note 8, at 810 n.279 (noting the consistency in the Ohio
Supreme Court’s application of plain language of the statutes, as well as the Court’s indifference to 
legislative policy). 
100. See supra Part II.C.
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the lower courts and may continue to yield “intent-defeating results.”101 
Thus, for the Ohio pretermitted heir statute to be applicable to revocable 
trusts, an amendment of the statute by the General Assembly is 
necessary.102 Although a vast majority of states’ pretermitted heir 
statutes apply only to wills,103 Ohio would not be the first state to 
provide protection to a child inadvertently omitted from a revocable 
trust.104 
IV. RATIONALE FOR AMENDING THE PRETERMITTED HEIR STATUTE TO
REVOCABLE TRUSTS 
Because wills were historically the basic method for transferring 
property upon death, it follows that some rules of construction were 
drafted to apply only to wills.105 A majority of state courts and 
legislatures have been slow to respond to the vast increase in the use of 
revocable trusts as will substitutes.106 By failing to extend wills 
pretermitted heir statutes to revocable trusts, the policy of such statutes 
to protect unintentionally disinherited children or heirs is undermined.107 
By extending certain wills rules to revocable trusts and other nonprobate 
transfers, a few state legislatures have successfully demonstrated the 
movement toward unifying the law of wills and will substitutes, a policy 
recognized by the Restatements, the Uniform Probate Code, and the 
Uniform Trust Code alike.108 
101. Leslie & Sterk, supra note 92, at 69 n.45. 
102. See English, supra note 50, at 11; see also Schwickerath, supra note 8, at 813-14 
(“Judicial intervention can make only piecemeal efforts to solve this problem of inconsistency.”). 
103. Newman, supra note 2, at 550. 
104. See infra Part IV.A.
105. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.2 cmt. a 
(AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
106. Id.; see also Schwickerath, supra note 8, at 814 (“Unless and until broad based legislative 
reform takes place, many states will remain in the quagmire of uncertainty concerning the 
applicability of policy-driven substantive restrictions on testation to a decedent’s nonprobate, but 
essentially testamentary transfers. . . . [I]t seems unlikely that legislatures will be willing to review 
the importance of those policies expressed in their probate codes to determine whether their reach 
should be extended.”). 
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 34.2 cmt. g (AM. LAW 
INST. 1992); id. § 34.2(2). (“[T]he policy of the statute in the controlling state applicable to an 
omitted issue in a will should be applied by analogy to the omitted issue in the substitute for a will, 
or in the transfer revocable by the donor at the time of the donor’s death.”).  
108. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.2 cmt. a 
(“[R]ules of construction and other interpretative devices aid in determining and giving effect to the 
donor’s intention or probable intention and hence should apply generally to donative documents.”); 
UNIF. PROB. CODE prefatory note (1990) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (explaining the policy of 
unifying the law of probate and nonprobate transfers); UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note (UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 2010) (noting a basic policy of the UTC is to treat revocable trusts as equivalent to 
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A. Several States Have Properly Extended the Pretermitted Heir
Statute to Revocable Trusts
A few states have enacted statutes that extend the pretermitted heir
statute to revocable trusts. This has been accomplished by state 
legislatures in different ways. For example, the Iowa legislature enacted 
a separate provision that effectively extends Iowa’s wills pretermitted 
heir statute109 to revocable trusts.110 The enactment of this statute by the 
Iowa legislature was an attempt to unify the law of wills and the law of 
revocable trusts.111 However, it has been argued that there is no 
coordination between Iowa’s pretermitted heir statute applicable to wills 
and the statute applicable to revocable trusts.112 Because the statutes 
treat wills and trusts separately and fail to address several problems that 
could potentially arise when a decedent implements a will and revocable 
trust into his or her estate plan, such problems may require resolution by 
the Iowa courts.113 
Conversely, other states have enacted pretermitted heir statutes that 
apply to both probate and nonprobate property.114 For example, in 1994 
the California legislature extended all of its wills rules of construction to 
revocable trusts.115 The pretermitted heir provisions of the California 
Probate Code apply to “testamentary instrument[s],” which include a 
wills). 
109. IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.267 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
110. Id. § 633A.3106. 
111. Martin D. Begleiter, In the Code We Trust – Some Trust Law for Iowa at Last, 49 DRAKE 
L. REV. 165, 219 (2001). The revocation-by-divorce provision of the Iowa statutes, Section
633.3107, was another wills law that was extended by the Iowa legislature to revocable trusts. Id. at 
219-20. 
112. See Martin D. Begleiter, Son of the Trust Code – The Iowa Trust Code After Ten Years, 
59 DRAKE L. REV. 265, 331 (2011). 
113. Id. For example, the statutes do not address what would happen if afterborn children were 
not mentioned in the revocable trust but were mentioned in the will. Id. 
114. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21601 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 4 of 2017 Reg. Sess.); 20 PA. 
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7710.2 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); see also MO. 
ANN. STAT. § 461.059 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Veto Sess. of the 98th GA). Missouri’s statute 
applies more generally to nonprobate transfers and distinguishes the wills pretermitted heir statute 
from the statute that is applicable to nonprobate transfers by providing that “[n]o law intended to 
protect a spouse or child from unintentional disinheritance by the will of a testator shall apply to a 
nonprobate transfer.” MO. ANN. STAT. § 461.059. However, because “nonprobate transfer,” as 
defined in Section 461.005 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, “does not include . . . a transfer under a 
trust established by an individual, either inter vivos or testamentary,” the statute does not apply to 
revocable trusts. Id. § 461.005. Like the California statute, Section 461.059 has been analyzed as an 
“awkward attempt” by the Missouri legislature to extend the protection of the omitted-child statute 
to nonprobate transfers. Grayson M.P. McCouch, Will Substitutes Under the Revised Uniform 
Probate Code, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1123, 1180 n.250 (1993). 
115. English, supra note 50, at 12. 
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“decedent’s will or revocable trust.”116 Under Section 21620, an omitted 
child receives a share of the estate,117 including the decedent’s probate 
estate and property held in a revocable trust, which the child would have 
received had the decedent died without executing a testamentary 
instrument.118 However, the “simplistic approach” of the California 
statutes has been described as only a partial success because it ignores 
the differences between trusts and wills.119 
Pennsylvania took a similar approach by enacting Section 7710.2 of 
the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes in 2006.120 Section 7710.2 
provides that “[t]he rules of construction that apply in this 
Commonwealth to the provisions of testamentary trusts also apply as 
appropriate to the provisions of inter vivos trusts.”121 Pennsylvania’s 
pretermitted heir statute can be found in Section 2507(4), which states 
that if a testator fails to provide in his will for an afterborn or after-
adopted child, the child receives a share of the property not passing to a 
surviving spouse.122 Although Section 2507(4) expressly refers to a child 
unintentionally disinherited from a will, a comment to Section 7710.2 
explains that “section [7710.2] imports section 2507 . . . and other 
statutory and judicial rules of interpretation that apply to trusts under 
wills.”123 Thus, Section 7110.2 operates to include revocable trust assets 
into the property distributable as an intestate share under Pennsylvania’s 
pretermitted heir statute in Section 2507(4).124 
B. Because Revocable Trusts Are Functionally Equivalent to Wills, the
Pretermitted Heir Statute Should Similarly Apply
It has been argued that the UPC appropriately did not extend the
omitted child provisions to will substitutes.125 For example, in order to 
116. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21601. 
117. Id. § 21620. Estate is defined as “a decedent’s probate estate and all property held in any
revocable trust that becomes irrevocable on the death of the decedent” Id. § 21601. 
118. Id. § 21620. 
119. English, supra note 50, at 12. 
120. 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7710.2 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.). 
This provision is a codification of Section 112 of the UTC. See infra Part V.A. 
121. 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7710.2 (emphasis added). 
122. 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2507(4). 
123. 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7710.2 cmt. 
124. Id. § 7710.2; see also In re Tr. Under Deed of Kulig, 131 A.3d 494, 500 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2015), appeal granted, No. 217 MAL 2016, 2016 WL 5820602 (Pa. Oct. 4, 2016) (discussing the 
applicability of Section 7710.2 to a revocable trust in determining a decedent’s intent in the 
pretermitted spouse context, noting that the “comment [to Section 7710.2] references Section 2507 
in its entirety”). 
125. See McCouch, supra note 114, at 1179.
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determine whether the testator intended to disinherit an omitted child, it 
may be impractical to inquire into a testator’s comprehensive dispositive 
plan for each individual will substitute.126 This argument, however, 
applies to single-asset will substitutes rather than revocable trusts,127 
which, like wills, usually provide a comprehensive dispositive plan.128 
While it may be unreasonable and difficult to extend the pretermitted 
heir statute to include all standard single-asset will substitutes,129 this 
same rationale does not necessarily apply to revocable trusts.130 Because 
revocable trusts are functionally equivalent to wills131 and are generally 
used as will substitutes in order to avoid probate administration, the 
basis for inconsistent treatment of wills and revocable trusts is 
lacking.132 
C. The Ohio General Assembly Has, on a Case-by-Case Basis,
Extended Wills Rules to Trusts
The General Assembly has made many wills rules also apply to
revocable trusts. This has been accomplished in different ways. For 
example, some of the wills rules have been extended to trusts by the 
enactment of separate statutes and provisions that apply specifically to 
revocable trusts.133 Conversely, some Ohio statutes are broad enough to 
apply to both probate and nonprobate transfers, including revocable 
trusts.134 
126. Id. Because a will disposes of residual property, it is reasonable to take into account the
testator’s dispositive plan when interpreting a will. Id.  
127. See id. at 1180 n.250. 
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 34.2 cmt. g (AM. LAW 
INST. 1992) (Because a revocable trust usually involves “multiple benefits being shared among 
described beneficiaries,” a situation in which a revocable trust instrument is used is analogous to a 
situation in which a will is used.); see also Langbein, supra note 5, at 1115 n.32 (explaining that 
unlike single-asset will substitutes, such as pay-on-death accounts and life insurance, revocable 
trusts can apply to all types of property). 
129. Leslie & Sterk, supra note 92, at 69 (explaining the complexity of drafting an omitted
child statute to cover nonprobate transfers). 
130. Newman, supra note 2, at 550. 
131. Under the UTC, a revocable trust is functionally equivalent to a will while the settlor is
living. David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions and Policy Issues, 
67 MO. L. REV. 143, 187 (2002). Moreover, the capacity requirement for the creation, revocation, or 
amendment of a trust is also the capacity standard that applies to wills. Id; see also UNIF. TRUST 
CODE § 601 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). 
132. Langbein, supra note 5, at 1136-37.
133. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5808.19 (West, Westlaw through File 2 of the 132nd
GA (2017-2018)) (Anti-lapse); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5815.31 (Revocation by divorce). 
134. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.19 (Slayer rule); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2113.86 (Apportionment of taxes). 
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As mentioned in Part II of this Comment,135 by enacting Section 
5808.19 of the Ohio Revised Code, the Ohio General Assembly 
extended the wills anti-lapse statute to revocable trusts.136 The statute 
addresses problems, like the issue in Dollar Savings,137 that occur when 
a trust beneficiary—whether an individual or member of a class—
predeceases the decedent and determines whether the surviving 
descendants of the beneficiary take the property that the beneficiary 
would have been entitled to had the beneficiary survived.138 Similar to 
the Ohio statute that controls issues that arise when dealing with a 
devisee under a will who predeceases the testator,139 the provisions of 
Section 5808.19 apply unless the trust instrument shows a contrary 
intent by the settlor.140 
The General Assembly also enacted Section 5815.31, which 
provides that upon a settlor’s divorce, dissolution, annulment, or actual 
separation from settlor’s spouse, any provision in a revocable trust that 
confers upon the settlor’s spouse any beneficial interest, power of 
appointment, or nomination as a trustee or trust advisor is automatically 
revoked.141 This is equivalent to Section 2107.33(D) of the Revised 
Code, which automatically revokes any provision in a will upon a 
testator’s divorce, dissolution, annulment, or actual separation that 
confers upon the former spouse a disposition of property, power of 
appointment, or nomination in the will as executor, trustee, or 
guardian.142 In fact, the most recent amendment to Section 5815.31, 
which added language clarifying that divorce terminates “any beneficial 
interest,” reaffirms the intent of the General Assembly that divorce 
revokes the same interest in revocable trusts as it does beneficial 
interests under wills.143 
135. Supra Part II.
136. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5808.19.
137. Dollar Sav. & Tr. Co. of Youngstown v. Turner, 529 N.E.2d 1261 (Ohio 1988). 
138. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5808.19 (B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii). 
139. Id. § 2107.52. This was the statute that the Ohio Supreme Court in Dollar Savings held 
was applicable to revocable trusts. See supra Part II.B. 
140. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5808.19(B)(2); see also John D. Clark, Antilapse Statutes for
Wills and Trusts: Rules of Construction & Expanded Statutory Distribution Authority for Trustee, 
22 OHIO PROB. L.J. NL 6 (2012) (explaining that because the statute addresses only trusts that are 
not clear on the settlor’s intent, the statute will not apply to well drafted trusts); see also Langbein, 
supra note 5, at 1137 (explaining that because financial intermediaries are cognizant of the lapse 
problem, the anti-lapse statute would be applied to will substitutes only on occasion, but noting that 
a variety of situations are not corrected by the business practices of financial intermediaries). 
141. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5815.31. 
142. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.33(D).
143. See William B. McNeil, Amended Sub. S.B. 106 Saved from the Savings Statute and
Other Changes, 20 OHIO PROB. L.J. 167 (2010) (citing Robert M. Brucken, Divorce and Revocable 
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Similarly, the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, enacted by the 
General Assembly in 2002,144 aims to resolve issues that arise when a 
governing instrument does not require a beneficiary to survive the 
decedent by a stated period of time, and the beneficiary dies 
simultaneously (or nearly simultaneously) with the decedent.145 The 
Ohio statute provides that for certain probate purposes146 and for 
purposes of a provision of a revocable trust agreement or other 
governing instrument147 relating to the person surviving an event,148 a 
person who does not survive another person by 120 hours, established 
by clear and convincing evidence, is deemed to have predeceased the 
other person.149 
Another example is Section 2105.19 of the Revised Code,150 which 
is commonly referred to as a “slayer statute.”151 These statutes prevent a 
slayer from benefitting from the decedent’s death.152 The statute applies 
to “[a]ll property of the decedent, and all money, insurance proceeds, or 
other property or benefits payable or distributable in respect of the 
decedent’s death.”153 Under the statute, a person who causes the death of 
the decedent is treated as having predeceased the decedent and becomes 
a constructive trustee for the benefit of the individuals entitled to the 
property.154 Ohio courts have construed Section 2105.19 to be applicable 
Trusts, 18 OHIO PROB. L.J. 196 (2008)). 
144. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.31. 
145. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-702 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); see also Edward 
C. Halbach, Jr. & Lawrence W. Waggoner, The UPC’s New Survivorship and Antilapse Provisions, 
55 ALB. L. REV. 1091, 1095-96 (1992) (explaining that the survival requirement better serves the
decedent’s intent because the person who dies within 120 hours of the decedent will not likely
receive any personal benefit from the property and thus, the property should go to the decedent’s 
heirs or devisees instead of the deceased beneficiary’s heirs or devisees).
146. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.32 (Determination of survivorship with respect to
specified person). 
147. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.33 (Determination of survivorship with respect to
specified event). For purposes of this section, “governing instrument” includes a deed, will, trust, 
insurance or annuity policy, account with a transfer-on-death designation or the abbreviation TOD, 
account with a payable-on-death designation or the abbreviation POD, pension, profit-sharing, 
retirement, or similar benefit plan, instrument creating or exercising a power of appointment or a 
power of attorney, or a dispositive, appointive, or nominative instrument of any similar type. OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.31(B). 
148. “Event” includes the death of another person. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.31(D). 
149. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2105.32-33. 
150. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.19. 
151. Karen J. Sneddon, Should Cain’s Children Inherit Abel’s Property?: Wading into the
Extended Slayer Rule Quagmire, 76 UMKC L. REV. 101, 109 (2007). 
152. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-803 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). 
153. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.19(A).
154. Id. § 2105.19(A)-(B).
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to funds in joint and survivorship accounts155 as well as to trusts.156 
Section 2113.86 of the Revised Code is another example of 
recognition by the Ohio legislature that in some contexts the same rules 
that apply to wills also should apply to revocable trusts.157 This statute 
controls the apportionment of estate taxes unless the will or other 
governing instrument provides otherwise.158 Under the statute, the tax is 
apportioned equitably against both gifts made in the clause of a will and 
gifts made in a provision of a revocable trust, and is then reapportioned 
to the residue of the estate or trust.159 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE OHIO GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Ohio courts are unlikely to address an issue unless it is presented,160
and even if an Ohio court resolved the pretermitted heir, revocable trust 
issue, it is unlikely that an afterborn, pretermitted heir would be 
protected by the current Ohio statute.161 Thus, in order to address the 
problem of inconsistent treatment between a child omitted under a will 
and a child omitted from a revocable trust instrument,162 action by the 
Ohio General Assembly is necessary, as this problem is unlikely to be 
resolved jurisprudentially. Corrective action by the General Assembly 
would be consistent with the states that have legislatively extended their 
pretermitted heir statutes to revocable trusts. This section of the 
Comment proposes two recommendations for the General Assembly, 
specifically, adopting Section 112 of the UTC and alternatively, 
extending Ohio’s current pretermitted heir statute to revocable trusts. 
With guidance from other state statutes and careful drafting, a statute can 
be enacted that effectively prevents the inconsistent treatment of wills 
and revocable trusts in the pretermitted heir context and fixes the current 
problems inherent in the statutes of other states. 
155. In re Estate of Fiore, 476 N.E.2d 1093, 1069 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984). The Fiore court noted 
that “[t]he language of the statute covers all property and all benefits payable in respect of 
decedent’s death and is not limited to property that descends according to intestate succession laws 
or passes by will.” Id. (emphasis added). 
156. Evans v. Evans, 2014-Ohio-4450, 20 N.E.3d 1139, ¶ 45-46 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014). 
157. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2113.86. 
158. Id. § 2113.86(A).
159. Id. § 2113.86(B). 
160. See Schwickerath, supra note 8, at 810 n.278. 
161. See supra Part III.
162. For example, consider the hypothetical presented in Part I supra. 
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A. Ohio Could, but is Unlikely to, Adopt Section 112 of the UTC
1. The Uniform Trust Code
The Uniform Trust Code (UTC), “the first national codification of
the law of trusts,”163 was approved by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in August of 2000.164 In 
response to the increased use of trusts and “day-to-day questions” arising 
related to trusts,165 the UTC drafters set out to develop a uniform law to 
provide “precise, comprehensive, and easily accessible guidance on trust 
law questions.”166 Modeled after existing state comprehensive trust 
statutes,167 the UTC incorporated existing Uniform Acts168 and was 
drafted in close coordination with the Restatement (Third) of Trusts.169 
The UTC also superseded some other Uniform Acts.170 For example, 
because Article VII of the UPC addressed only a limited number of 
topics regarding trust administration, the UTC superseded this Article, 
with the exception of the trust registration provisions.171 
Similarly, there is some overlap between the UTC and the UPC 
concerning rules of construction.172 As mentioned in Part III of this 
Comment, the UPC extends to trusts certain rules of construction 
applicable to wills.173 Although a “basic policy” of the UTC is the 
treatment of a revocable trust as the equivalent of a will,174 the UTC 
does not provide the “exact”175 rules of construction applicable to 
trusts.176 As the UTC’s Reporter has explained, this is in part due to the 
163. UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). 
164. Alan Newman, The Uniform Trust Code: An Analysis of Ohio’s Version, 34 OHIO N.U. L. 
REV. 135, 135 (2008). 
165. See UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note (This has also “led to a recognition that the trust
law in many States is thin. . . . [and] that the existing Uniform Acts relating to trusts, while 
numerous, are fragmentary.”).  
166. Id. 
167. For example, the Drafting Committee referred to the statutes already in effect in
California, Georgia, Indiana, Texas, and Washington throughout the drafting process. See UNIF. 
TRUST CODE prefatory note. 
168. Id.
169. UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note; see also English, supra note 50, at 2-3. 
170. UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note.
171. Id.
172. Id. 
173. See supra Part III.C.
174. UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note; see also Newman, supra note 2, at 568. 
175. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 112 cmt. 
176. UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note; see also English, supra note 131, at 162 (explaining
that although the UTC includes numerous provisions that address revocable trusts and “the Code’s 
drafters concluded that the rules of construction for revocable trusts . . . ought to be the same as the 
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recognition by the drafters that any attempt to draft detailed rules of 
construction for trusts would be unsuccessful and would be consistent 
with the laws of only a few states.177 
So instead, the rules of construction issue is addressed in a more 
general, optional provision in Section 112 of the UTC.178 Modeled after 
Section 25(2) and comment e of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts,179 
Section 112 of the UTC provides: “The rules of construction that apply 
in this State to the interpretation of and disposition of property by will 
also apply as appropriate to the interpretation of the terms of a trust and 
the disposition of the trust property.”180 A comment to Section 112 
explains that because different jurisdictions take different approaches 
regarding wills rules of construction, Section 112 provides that the 
enacting State’s specific wills construction rules, “whatever they may 
be,” will apply to the construction of trusts.181 
2. Application of Section 112
Thirty-one states and the District of Columbia have enacted
versions of the Uniform Trust Code,182 and several of those states have 
rules for wills,” the UTC does not provide a rules of construction section). 
177. English, supra note 131, at 162. This is because the rules of construction by state vary
greatly. Id.; see also John D. Clark, Anti-Lapse Statute for Trusts: Finding Grantor’s Intent in 
Absence of Clear Trust Language, 18 OHIO PROB. L.J. 196A (2008) (“The Uniform Trust Code, as a 
series of laws for trust administration, did not need to address the many rules of trust 
construction/interpretation because of the existence of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) that applies 
to trusts and not simply probate matters.”). 
178. A comment to Section 112 offers an alternative: 
Instead of enacting this section, a jurisdiction enacting this Code may wish to enact de-
tailed rules on the construction of trusts, either in addition to its rules on the construction
of wills or as part of one comprehensive statute applicable to both wills and trusts. For
this reason and to encourage this alternative, the section has been made optional. 
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 112 cmt. It appears Ohio has followed this method by, on a case-by-case 
basis, enacting detailed rules on the construction of trusts in addition to the will construction rules. 
See supra Part IV.C. 
179. The comment to Section 112 explains that unlike the Restatement, Section 112 applies to 
both revocable and irrevocable trusts. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 112 cmt. 
180. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 112. 
181. UNIF. TRUST CODE Article 1 General Comment.
182. The states that have enacted a version of the UTC include: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West 
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Legislative Fact Sheet – Trust Code, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Trust%20Code (last visited Apr. 14, 
2017).  
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adopted a provision based on Section 112 of the UTC.183 A recent case 
decided by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania illustrates the 
applicability of Pennsylvania’s version of Section 112 to a pretermitted 
spouse statute.184 In In re Trust under Deed of Kulig, a decedent 
executed a revocable deed of trust for the benefit of the decedent and his 
then-spouse.185 Following the execution of the trust, the spouse died and 
the decedent remarried.186 The surviving spouse argued that pursuant to 
Sections 2507(3)187 and 7710.2188 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated 
Statutes, she was entitled to an intestate share of the decedent’s estate 
including the principal of the trust.189 As a question of first impression, 
the court in Kulig considered the Joint State Government Commission 
Comments to, and the plain and unambiguous language of, Section 
7710.2.190 The court found that the text of Section 7710.2 
unambiguously applied existing wills rules of construction to the 
interpretation of revocable trusts, and that the legislature intended the 
pretermitted spouse rule to be applied to revocable trusts.191 
3. Ohio’s Adoption of the UTC—The Ohio Trust Code
Ohio enacted a modified version of the UTC, the Ohio Trust Code
183. ALA. CODE § 19-3B-112 (through Act 2017-130 of the 2017 Reg. Sess.); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14-10112 (West, Westlaw through First Reg. Sess. of the 53rd Leg. (2017)); ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 28-73-112 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Third Extraordinary Sess.); ME. STAT. tit. 
18-B, § 112 (Westlaw through Ch. 3 of the 2017 First Reg. Sess. of the 128th Leg.); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 564-B:1-112 (Westlaw through Ch. 7 of the 2017 Reg. Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
36C-1-112 (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7710.2 
(West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-112 (West, Westlaw through 
2016 Sess.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-112 (West, Westlaw through 2017 First Reg. Sess.); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 112 (West, Westlaw through First Sess. (2017)); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44D-
1-112 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
184. In re Tr. Under Deed of Kulig, 131 A.3d 494, 495 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015), appeal granted, 
No. 217 MAL 2016, 2016 WL 5820602 (Pa. Oct. 4, 2016). 
185. Id.
186. Id. 
187. 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2507(3) (Modification by circumstances – 
Marriage). 
188. 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7710.2 (Rules of construction – UTC 112). 
189. Kulig, 131 A.3d at 495.
190. Id. at 497, 499-501. 
191. Id. at 499, 501 (“In sum, we conclude that the plain language of Section 7710.2,
consistent with the legislative comments appended thereto, reveals the intention of the Legislature 
to make rules of construction consistent whether interpreting testamentary dispositions or inter-
vivos trusts.”); but see Bell v. Estate of Bell, 2008-NMCA-045, ¶ 32-33, 143 N.M. 716, 181 P.3d 
708 (holding, without referencing New Mexico’s version of Section 112 of the UTC, that a 
pretermitted spouse was not entitled to a share of the decedent’s revocable trust assets). 
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(OTC), which became effective January 1, 2007.192 Generally, the OTC 
codified existing trust law in Ohio, providing easily accessible answers 
to many questions.193 However, consistent with Section 112 of the UTC 
being an optional provision, a comparable provision was omitted from 
the OTC.194 Because Section 112 directly conflicts with Ohio Revised 
Code Section 2107.01, which defines “will” to exclude inter vivos trusts, 
it would present uncertainties in Ohio law.195 In that regard, in his article 
addressing the implications of enacting the UTC in Ohio, Professor 
English notes the importance of the “as appropriate” language of Section 
112: 
This phrase masks some very difficult questions. Not all will construc-
tion rules should necessarily be applied to trusts. Also, even those that 
should apply may require modification due to the legal distinctions be-
tween wills and trusts. There is a need for a consensus on which rules 
should apply, and once that issue has been determined, what they 
should say.196 
Thus, even after the enactment of the Ohio Trust Code, Ohio is left 
without “any comprehensive trust interpretation statute.”197 On trust 
interpretation issues for which there is not a specific statute, Ohio courts 
are left relying on common law to interpret trust documents with 
ambiguous or unclear language to determine how, considering the 
probable intent of the settlor, to distribute the trust assets.198 
Policy considerations suggest that the General Assembly should 
adopt Section 112 of the UTC as it applies to trusts.199 Additionally, 
similar issues involving the application of wills rules to trusts will 
continue to arise,200 and enactment of Section 112 would allow for 
192. For an overview of the impact of the enactment of the Ohio Trust Code, see Newman,
supra note 164. 
193. Id. at 136. 
194. Moore, supra note 8. 
195. Id. (citing Alan Newman, Report on HB 416: The Ohio Trust Code as Enacted, in OHIO 
TRUST CODE 2.16 (Robert M. Brucken ed., 2006)).  
196. English, supra note 50, at 12; see also English supra note 131, at 163 n.114 (explaining
why some rules of construction, such as abatement and the anti-lapse statute, would require 
modification and special definitions). 
197. Clark, supra note 177. However, Ohio is not in the minority. See English, supra note 131, 
at 162 (“While most states have enacted numerous statutes on the construction of wills, most have 
not enacted rules of construction applicable to revocable trusts and other nonprobate devices.”). 
198. Clark, supra note 177 (noting that difficult problems often arise due to a
misunderstanding of the law or inattentiveness of the drafting attorney). 
199. See supra Part IV.
200. The numerous problems that may arise in relation to revocable trusts include: (1) the
meaning to be given to particular words such as “heirs,” “descendants,” and “by representation”; (2) 
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predictability and could help to resolve such problems before they occur. 
The approach that Ohio has taken by addressing these issues on an “ad 
hoc basis” may be less efficient than others, because it may require 
amendment of statutes by the General Assembly each time an issue is 
presented.201 However, due to the “as appropriate” language of Section 
112, it is not clear whether this Section would apply to the pretermitted 
heir section even if Ohio were to adopt it.202 
Moreover, it is unlikely that Ohio would adopt Section 112. 
Following the approval of the UTC in 2000, “members of the Estate 
Planning, Trust, and Probate Law Section of the Ohio State Bar 
Association, and members of the Legal, Legislative, and Regulatory 
Committee of the Ohio Bankers League” carefully studied the UTC and 
its provisions until enacting Ohio’s version in 2006.203 Thus, because 
UTC Section 112 was specifically considered and omitted from the 
OTC,204 it is unlikely the General Assembly would backtrack. A more 
appropriate resolution may be for the General Assembly to, continuing 
its pattern of extending wills rules of construction to trusts on a case-by-
case basis, extend the pretermitted heir rule to revocable trusts.205 
B. The Ohio General Assembly Should Extend the Wills Pretermitted
Heir Statute to Trusts
Although it is not likely that an Ohio court would extend the current
Ohio pretermitted heir statute to revocable trusts, there are sound policy 
reasons for the Ohio legislature to do so, as it has done with the anti-
lapse and several other statutes.206 The same policy reasons for 
abatement; and (3) ademption. See English, supra note 50, at 11-12.  
201. Layman, supra note 14. Alternatively, the General Assembly could enact one
comprehensive statute applicable to both wills and trusts. See supra note 178. However, this 
approach would likely introduce problems by ignoring the differences between wills and trusts, see 
English, supra note 131, at 162, and like Section 112, would present uncertainties in Ohio law, see 
Alan Newman, Report on HB 416: The Ohio Trust Code as Enacted, in OHIO TRUST CODE 
HANDBOOK (2006), at 17,
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1167&context=ua_law_publications. 
202. See Layman, supra note 14. 
203. Newman, supra note 164, at 135-36. 
204. Newman, supra note 201, at 17. 
205. See Moore, supra note 8 (“The Ohio General Assembly has been attentive to the task of
adopting construction rules applicable to wills to trusts on a case by case basis and, hopefully, this 
effort will continue in the coming years.”).  
206. See Angela G. Carlin, Anti-lapse statute pertaining to trusts, 1 BALDWIN’S OH. PRAC. 
MERRICK-RIPPNER PROB. L. § 34:20 (2014) (explaining that because trusts are increasingly used as 
will substitutes, the legislature found it appropriate to apply wills anti-lapse rules of construction to 
trusts); see also Clark, supra note 140 (noting that because the trust is a common will substitute, the 
anti-lapse rule of construction for wills appropriately applies to trusts). 
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extending the anti-lapse statute are present when considering the 
pretermitted heir statute.207 As rules of construction, the anti-lapse and 
pretermitted heir statutes aim to give effect to the intention or probable 
intention of the donor.208 Similarly, when certain events occur after the 
execution of a will or donative document, some rules of construction 
assume how, following such an event, a donor would have revised the 
will or donative document.209 For example, the pretermitted heir statute 
assumes how a testator would have revised his or her will after the birth 
or adoption of a child.210 Moreover, the purpose of the pretermitted heir 
statute is to prevent the unintentional disinheritance of a child born after 
the execution of the will, and the rationale for applying this statute to 
wills is equally applicable when a revocable trust is used as a will 
substitute.211 
1. Issues with Current State Statutes Extending Pretermitted Heir
Statutes to Revocable Trusts
As explained in Part IV,212 Iowa enacted a separate pretermitted 
heir statute applicable to revocable trusts. Because the Iowa statutes treat 
wills and trusts differently, many questions are left unanswered.213 For 
example, the statutes do not address what would happen if an afterborn 
child was mentioned in a will but not mentioned in a trust instrument.214 
Similarly, the statutes do not address the ramifications of a decedent 
including an intentional omission provision in the trust instrument but 
not in the will.215 Specifically, Section 633.267 provides that a child 
Notably, the Estate Planning, Trust and Probate Law Section of the Ohio State Bar Association 
recently proposed modifications that would allow for the procedure under Ohio’s pre-mortem 
statute to apply similarly to trusts. Ralph Lehman, Wills and Trusts: Updating Ohio’s Pre-Mortem 
Validation Law, 26 OHIO PROB. L.J. 191, 191-92 (2016) (arguing that this modification is necessary 
due to the evolution of estate planning and the conventional use of trusts in estate plans). 
207. See supra Parts III.A., IV.
208. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.2 cmt. a 
(AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
209. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 112 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). 
210. See McCouch, supra note 114, at 1180 (explaining that pretermitted heir statutes operate
essentially as constructional rules to determine whether a decedent’s failure to provide for a child 
was intentional). 
211. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
212. Supra Part IV.A.
213. Begleiter, supra note 112, at 331. 
214. Id. Presumably, if the afterborn child is mentioned in a will but not in a trust instrument,
the child would also receive a share of the trust assets. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 633A.3106 (West, 
Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.). However, if it appears from the terms of the will that the 
omission was intentional, the child would not receive a share. Id. 
215. IOWA CODE ANN. § 633A.3106. 
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omitted from a will receives an intestate share “unless it appears from 
the will that such omission was intentional.”216 By contrast, Section 
633A.3106 provides that a child omitted from a revocable trust 
instrument receives an intestate share, “unless it appears from the terms 
of the trust or decedent’s will that such omission was intentional.”217 
Thus, if a decedent’s will indicates intent to omit the child, the 
pretermitted child is prevented from taking from the revocable trust.218 
The approach taken by California of extending all wills rules of 
constructions to trusts may also present problems. Unlike the Iowa 
provisions that treat wills and trusts differently, California’s approach 
ignores the difference between trusts and wills altogether.219 However, 
the California statutes seem to address some of the issues that may arise 
when applying the Iowa statutes. The California statute reads: 
[I]f a decedent fails to provide in a testamentary instrument for a child
of decedent born or adopted after the execution of all of the decedent’s
testamentary instruments, the omitted child shall receive a share in the
decedent’s estate equal in value to that which the child would have re-
ceived if the decedent had died without having executed any testamen-
tary instrument.220
Under the California statutes, if a child is born after the execution of all 
of the decedent’s testamentary instruments (including both the will and 
revocable trust instrument) and the afterborn child is provided for in a 
decedent’s will but not the trust instrument, whether the child receives a 
share of the trust assets will depend on the circumstances of that case.221 
Under California law, in order for a decedent to effectively disinherit an 
afterborn child, the decedent’s intention to disinherit the child must 
appear on the face of the instrument that “at the time of its execution, the 
decedent had the child in mind and knowledgeably and intentionally 
omitted to provide for the child.”222 Thus, if the decedent made clear in 
216. IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.267 (Children born or adopted after execution of will).
217. IOWA CODE ANN. § 633A.3106 (Children born or adopted after execution of a revocable
trust) (emphasis added). 
218. Begleiter, supra note 112, at 331. 
219. English, supra note 50, at 12. 
220. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21620 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 4 of the 2017 Reg. Sess.).
221. For example, the omitted child would not receive a share of the decedent’s estate if: (1)
the decedent’s intention to disinherit the child appears in the testamentary instruments; or (2) the 
decedent had one or more children and devised substantially all the estate to the omitted child’s 
other parent; or (3) the decedent provided for the child by transfer outside of the testamentary 
instruments. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21621. 
222. Edith C. Schaffer, 1 CAL. TRANSACTIONS FORMS—EST. PLANNING Omitted Child
Statutes § 6:31, Westlaw (database updated June 2015) (citing In re Torregano’s Estate, 352 P.2d 
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the trust instrument that the omission of the child was intentional, the 
omitted child would not be entitled to a portion of the trust assets.223 
Additionally, when a decedent includes an intentional omission 
provision in the trust but not in the will, the child would receive a share 
of the decedent’s estate equal in value to what the child would have 
received had the decedent died without having executed any 
testamentary instrument.224 
2. Consideration of these Issues Will Provide for a More Careful
and Effective Drafting of Ohio’s Statute
For several reasons, if the General Assembly were to extend Ohio’s 
pretermitted heir statute to revocable trusts, amending the current wills 
pretermitted heir statute to include revocable trusts would be preferable 
to enacting a separate statute that applies only to revocable trusts. First, 
revocable trusts are functionally equivalent to wills and both are often 
used by decedents in comprehensive estate plans.225 Thus, treating wills 
and revocable trusts separately in this context would likely present more 
issues than providing one statute that applies to both wills and trusts. 
Similarly, it will be simpler to give effect to the presumed intent of the 
decedent to provide for an inadvertently-omitted child by including rules 
applicable to both wills and trusts within one statute. 
Next, in order to draft a statute that effectively provides for an 
afterborn child omitted from a revocable trust instrument, it must be 
determined under what circumstances a pretermitted child should take. 
Ohio’s wills pretermitted heir statute applies in instances where: (1) 
505 (Cal. 1960); Smith v. Crook, 206 Cal. Rptr. 524 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)) (“To effectively 
omit a child, the disinheritance provision in a testamentary instrument must either specifically 
mention the child . . . to be omitted, or must contain language clearly evidencing the decedent’s 
intention, at the time of executing the instrument, to omit the child . . . from sharing in the estate.”); 
see also Derek P. Cole, Chapter 724: The California Bar Association’s 1997 Omnibus Probate Law 
Amendments, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 397, 401 (1998) (“To the extent a person chooses not to 
provide for a child or spouse they will have to make this explicit in their trust instrument. There will 
be no uncertainties as to whom the trustor intended to provide for and whether the omission of a 
certain child or spouse was accidental.”) (footnotes omitted). 
223. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21621. 
224. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21620 Section 21621(a) provides: “The decedent’s failure to provide 
for the child in the decedent’s testamentary instruments was intentional and that intention appears 
from the testamentary instruments.” CAL. PROB. CODE § 21621(a). It seems this provision could be 
construed to mean that if there were an intentional omission provision in either the decedent’s trust 
instrument or the will (but not both), the afterborn child would not receive a share of the estate. 
225. See Newman, supra note 2, at 524; English supra note 131, at 187 n.189 (“[T]he 
revocable trust is normally used in conjunction with a pourover will. The use of a pourover will 
assures that property not transferred to the trust during life will, at death, be combined and 
distributed with the property the settlor managed to convey.”). 
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“after making a will, a testator has a child born alive, adopts a child, or 
designates an heir . . . , or if a child or designated heir who is absent and 
reported to be dead proves to be alive;” (2) the child has not been 
provided for in the will or by settlement; (3) it does not appear by the 
will that the testator intended to disinherit the pretermitted child or heir; 
and (4) the entire estate is not devised to the surviving spouse.226 
Presumably, the same circumstances that invoke the wills pretermitted 
heir statute would be applicable to omissions of an afterborn child from 
a trust instrument. 
The General Assembly should also consider instances when a 
decedent may implement both a will and a revocable trust in his or her 
comprehensive dispositive plan and address the potential problems that 
are made apparent by the other states’ pretermitted heir statutes.227 Thus, 
the statute should specify what happens when a decedent provides for a 
pretermitted child in a will but not a trust instrument, or conversely, 
when the decedent provides for the child in a trust instrument but not a 
will.228 One approach the General Assembly could take is providing that 
an afterborn child receives an intestate share of the estate, including the 
revocable trust assets, “unless it appears by either the will or revocable 
trust instrument that it was the intention of the testator to disinherit the 
pretermitted child or heir.”229 Thus, any intention in either the will or 
trust to disinherit the child will apply to both instruments. Alternatively, 
the General Assembly could, like California, require the decedent to 
indicate the intent to disinherit in each testamentary instrument or 
otherwise the child will take an intestate share.230 
Similarly, it should be determined whether the child must be born 
after the execution of both the will and the revocable trust instrument in 
order to be considered pretermitted, and what effect it has, if any, if the 
will and the trust instrument were executed at the same time.231 Because 
under Section 2107.34 the child must be born or adopted after the 
execution of the will in order to receive a share, a comparable provision 
that requires a child to be born after the execution of both the will and 
226. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.34 (West, Westlaw through File 2 of the 132nd GA (2017-
2018)). 
227. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 21620-21621 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 4 of the 2017 Reg.
Sess.); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 633.267, 633A.3106 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
228. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 21620-21621; IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 633.267, 633A.3106. 
229. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.34. 
230. Id.
231. For example, if the will and the trust instrument were executed at the same time and the
decedent provides for an afterborn child in the will but not the trust instrument, presumably that 
would demonstrate the decedent’s intent not to provide for the child in the trust instrument. 
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the trust instrument would allow for easier administration of the rule.232 
VI. CONCLUSION
The Ohio General Assembly should amend the pretermitted heir 
statute to allow an afterborn child to receive a share of their deceased 
parent’s property, regardless of whether the child was inadvertently 
omitted from a will or revocable trust instrument. Although, in general, 
state legislatures have been slow to respond to the increase in the use of 
revocable trusts as will substitutes, persuasive authority supports the 
extension of this rule to revocable trusts. Moreover, the Ohio legislature 
has responded to similar issues that arise in relation to revocable trusts 
on a case-by-case basis and should do so here. By amending the statute, 
a decedent’s presumed intent will be given effect regardless of whether 
the decedent chooses to use a will, a revocable trust, or both, to dispose 
of his property at his death. Similarly, in the context of the hypothetical 
in the Introduction to this Comment, amendment of the statute will allow 
for equal treatment under Ohio law of child B, who was unintentionally 
omitted from Settlor’s revocable trust instrument, and child A, who was 
inadvertently omitted from Testator’s will. 
232. Instead, having to establish a timeline including the date of the execution of the will and
the trust instrument, if the will and the trust instrument were executed at different times, and the 
birth date of a child would be more burdensome than enforcing a rule like that enacted by the 
California legislature. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21620. 
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